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Introduction 
The present chapter addresses the financial dimension of African peace operations. Its 
objective is to identify the different forms of financial arrangements that make African peace 
operations possible, and to raise some of the main political issues associated with each of 
them. Four types of such arrangements will be discussed: 1. when African states deploy 
military missions with their own financial resources; 2. when financial support is offered on a 
voluntary and ad hoc basis by non-African partners, not only through bilateral channels, but 
also through multilateral mechanisms set by regional organisations like the European Union 
(EU); 3. when African-led operations are funded by the assessed-contributions to the United 
Nations (UN) peacekeeping budget; and 4. when African troops contributing countries are 
given the institutional and financial cover of a formal UN-commanded peace operation. 
This taxonomy is the result of an inductive method, founded on an exploratory, 
inevitably selective, investigation among case studies – some very recent, others less – that 
the authors have worked on. While it does not pretend to cover all the imaginable options, this 
taxonomy does allow us to address the most vivacious debates in relation to the funding of 
peace operations. The question of African ownership is one of the controversies which are of 
concern to both practitioners and academics. Indeed, one cannot miss the situation of 
dependency, which characterizes the African peace and security architecture, as well as the 
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consequences of this situation on the limited freedom of action African states and 
organizations have in their endeavours.1 
Going beyond the idea of a mere opposition between two categories of actors 
(Africans vs. non-Africans) trying to claim ownership over the management of peace 
missions, this chapter analyzes the contextual negotiations, involving both African (be they 
regional organisations or states) and external actors, which have given rise to the existing 
funding arrangements. Importantly, the result of these discussions is always unpredictable, 
which means the division of labour between organisations is not based on their comparative 
advantages,2 but rather on the basis of compromises made on a case-by-case basis. 
At first glance, our fourfold taxonomy fails to offer well-cut, exclusive categories that 
avoid mutual overlapping. For instance, one may ask why funding by regional multilateral 
institutions on a voluntary and ad hoc basis is distinguished from funding by the UN, which, 
after all, is just another multilateral institution? Is it the regional nature of the first that is 
making the difference here? Or is it that the support through the EU may allow some 
European states to gather support for particular African states, whereas the UN does not offer 
this kind of multilateral institutional cover for state-to-state relations? In fact, each of the 
mechanisms offers varying rooms of manoeuvre to the parties involved. For instance, when an 
external donor state opts for financial support on a bilateral basis, it can suspend it or refuse to 
                                               
1 R. Esmenjaud, L’africanisation et l’appropriation africaine des opérations de paix: Etude politique et 
historique à travers les missions africaines au Tchad (1979-1982), en RCA (1997 à nos jours) et au Darfour 
(2004 à nos jours), PhD thesis, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, 2012; P.A. 
Kasaija, ‘The African Union (AU), the Libya Crisis and the notion of “African solutions to African problems”’, 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 31, 2013, pp. 117-138; B. Franke and S. Gänzle, ‘How “African” Is 
the African Peace and Security Architecture? Conceptual and Practical Constraints of Regional Security 
Cooperation in Africa’, African Security 5, 2012, pp. 88-104. 
2 For instance, the UN is said to be more efficient in the field of post-conflict peacebuilding, compared to 
regional organizations, which are often considered more able as far as peace imposition is concerned. 
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renew it later on. Alternatively, when the UN budget is mobilized to take charge of the 
funding of others’ peace operations (here, an African regional organization), it is seriously 
reducing the donors’ leverage on the mission. In the end, organizations shall here be thought 
of as providers of resources, be they political (legitimacy) or financial, to states wishing to 
deploy peace missions.  
Throughout our empirical investigation, we have met some – rare – instances where 
African states have themselves funded their peace operations. By starting with a discussion 
around those examples, we will be able to better understand the conditions under which 
African states have displayed readiness to mobilize their own resources and a desire to act 
autonomously. But the situations where African actors find it more interesting or valuable to 
resort to the UN or external partners are much more common, despite the calls from the big 
donors for a stronger African financial contribution. This contradicts the idea of African 
ownership, which implies African funding for African missions (‘he who pays the piper calls 
the tune’, as practitioners say). 
Why, in most cases, African actors show no interest in financial ownership by relying 
on the resources of others is the question policy-makers keep asking every time a new mission 
is established. It is assumed that our discussion on those four types of financial arrangements 
offer some useful insight to deal with this question. Examining each of these types 
successively will shed light on some underlying political stakes for the different actors 
involved. 
 
African Operations Funded by African Actors 
This first model refers to cases when African actors have funded their own peace 
interventions, or those of their ‘brothers’ from the continent. This unusual scenario mainly 
took place in a context where African regional powers were exposed to the risk of 
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destabilization in their vicinity and, more precisely, under the threat of interferences by rival 
powers (be they African or extra-African). 
The first mission ever deployed by an African organization took place in Chad in late 
1981,3 where the sending of troops from Zaïre, Senegal and Nigeria was largely funded by 
France and the United States (US). But this experience was preceded by two others, much less 
dependent on Western partners, and much less addressed in the literature. First, in March 
1979, Nigerian troops were sent to Ndjamena to supervise a truce between the Chadian parties 
signed in Kano the same month. Through this initiative, Lagos hoped to stabilize the situation 
in this neighbour country and pave the way for the withdrawal of the French troops, which 
had been present in the country since independence. Refusing some of the aid offered by 
France, Lagos displayed a true willingness to remain independent. After Nigerian troops had 
to withdraw on the request of Chadian authorities, Nigeria, together with Libya, pushed for 
the sending of another operation comprising troops from Guinea, Togo and Congo, whose 
main objective was again to replace French soldiers. Only Congolese troops were deployed 
thanks to Algerian air transportation support. Those troops, which never went out of their 
barracks and were lacking all kinds of resources including funding, withdrew as soon as the 
fighting broke out again in early 1980. 
The history of the project of an all-African Defence force was also largely shaped by 
such reactive postures. Among the many proposals to establish such an intervention capacity, 
one can mention Kwame N’Krumah’s famous projects of a Defence Force in the early 1960s, 
Sierra Leone’s African Defence Organisation (1965), Nigeria’s African Defence System 
(1970), or the project of a Defence Force of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
                                               
3 By mistake, the 1978 interventions in Shaba are sometimes associated with the OAU. For Chad, see T. Mays, 
Africa’s First Peacekeeping Operation: The OAU in Chad, 1981-1982, Westport: Praeger, 2002. 
Supprimé: d
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discussed between 1978 and 1981.4 It must be emphasised, however, that most of these 
projects were put forward as a reaction to initiatives by external actors. For instance, attempts 
at destabilizing African countries by Portugal, both in 1970 and 1974, were followed by 
discussions to reinforce pan-African cooperation.5 Likewise, in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
– when the OAU probably moved closest to the creation of such a force6 – debates followed 
the April 1978 Franco-African Summit, where Senegalese President Leopold Sédar Senghor 
was given the mandate to study the possibility of establishing an African multilateral 
intervention capacity.7 In the end, none of these projects was translated into reality. Beyond 
opposition around the very role such a force should play – whether it should defend the 
regimes in power or, rather, the states of Africa as a whole8 – not only the required resources, 
but also the political will to mobilize them, were missing. Many of the projects actually 
resembled ‘window-dressing’ initiatives through which their promoters could get pan-African 
credentials. While being reluctant to publicly challenge the relevance of such a tool, many 
states were actually comfortable with relying on the support from their external patrons, most 
often their former colonial master. 
                                               
4 B. Franke, ‘A Pan-African Army: The Evolution of an Idea and its Eventual Realisation in the African Standby 
Force’, African Security Review 15, 2006, pp. 1-16. 
5 In 1971, Portugal supported a coup attempt against Guinean President Sekou Touré and, in 1974, it attacked the 
freshly-independent state of Guinea-Bissau. 
6 In July 1979, the OAU Heads of states endorsed the principle of the creation of a pan-African force, and in 
April 1981, the Defence Commission endorsed a ‘Protocol establishing an African Defence Force’. 
7 This initiative aimed at giving a formal institutional cover to initiatives like the African interventions in Shaba 
(1978), which received strong support from France and the US. 
8 R. Esmenjaud, ‘Africa’s Conception of Security in Transition: The Continent’s Approach to Multilateral 
Interventions, from N’Krumah to the African Standby Force’, in Tim Murithi (ed.), Handbook of Africa’s 
International Relations, London: Routledge, 2013 (forthcoming). 
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The recent turn towards African regional organisations has partly changed the face of 
these experiences of autonomy, yet the major features – presence of a regional power 
interested in maintaining the status quo in a context of regional competition – remain. These 
cases are still, however, the exception. During the 1990s, Nigeria followed a strategy of 
regional military activism in Liberia and Sierra Leone under the auspices of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and with the implicit support of the UN 
Security Council (UNSC). The United Kingdom (UK) and the US offered financial and 
technical assistance to the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the military force 
created by Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Sierra Leone – when the crisis was still confined 
to Liberia. Initially close to the two regimes and hostile to the ‘revisionist’ forces led by 
Charles Taylor (in Liberia) and Foday Sankoh (in Sierra Leone), Nigeria assumed for eight 
years the bulk of the financial (and political) costs of this mission. This was so until 
2000/2001, when the UN headquarters in New York and the UK took a firmer lead on the 
new UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, created in 1999). The latter also benefited from 
a massive deployment of the Guinean army against the insurgent elements. Two concomitant 
dynamics drove to the above Nigerian military involvement. First, the Nigerian authorities felt 
they were challenged by these rebellions that intended to topple political friends (Liberian 
President Samuel Doe and Sierra Leonean President Joseph Momoh were close to Nigerian 
President Ibrahim Babangida), and that were suspected to receive support from rival 
neighbours (from Muammar Gadhafi of Libya, Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, and Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire). Second, Nigerian partners within the UNSC were 
encouraging initiatives from sub-regional powers aimed at preserving stability and political 
status quo. At that time sending peace missions in internal conflicts was not (yet) the ‘normal’ 
thing to do in most UN members’ views, and decision-makers in Washington were anxious to 
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avoid an inflation of the UN budget that would have deepened their contribution arrears to the 
organization.9 Abuja progressively worked at demonstrating it could assume the role of a 
credible peacekeeping force in the region, particularly when President Sani Abacha was 
denounced by human rights organisations for having executed the writer Ken Saro-Wiwa.10 
More recently, Nigeria again displayed its capacity to induce ECOWAS into action by 
sending troops to Guinea-Bissau. In June 2012, breaking with the organization’s inertia vis-à-
vis the crisis in Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Burkina Faso sent about 550 troops to participate 
in the reform of Guinea-Bissau’s armed forces. The sending of this force, whose presence is 
funded autonomously with the exception of external transportation support, again represents a 
reaction to the infringement of a rival power in Nigeria’s backyard. The ECOWAS troops 
indeed replaced soldiers from Angola, which had been deployed in Guinea-Bissau under the 
umbrella of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries. 
Apart from the action of other ‘regional powers’ like South Africa, which intervened 
in Lesotho in 1998 without requesting any external support, examples of genuine African 
funding ownership are therefore very scarce. 
One can note that in January 2013, the AU has for the first time decided to participate 
in the funding of an African mission through its own budget. However, the US$ 50 million of 
promised aid to the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) only cover 
a small part of the budget of the mission (assessed to be close to US$ 1 billion). Besides, this 
                                               
9 This context is notably depicted by J. Woods, ‘US Decision-making During Operations in Somalia’, in W. 
Clarke and J. Herbst (eds.), Learning From Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, Boulder: 
Westview, 1997, p. 152, quoting Herman Cohen, former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 
(1989-1993). 
10 F.Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG Operations, 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000, pp. 142, 160-164; F. Olonisakin, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: 
The Story of UNAMSIL, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008, pp. 29-31. 
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promised contribution shall be partly mobilized by recovering arrears from AU member 
states.11 In the same vein, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is 
funding only about 30 percent of the mission deployed in the Central African Republic (CAR) 
(Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en Centrafrique – MICOPAX).12 
In this context, it should be questioned whether African states are simply not interested 
in gaining real ownership over their operations. One common argument to justify Africa’s 
dependence on external actors, regularly referred to by African leaders in particular, is 
resource scarcity. For instance, South Africa’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma, justified the initiative of her country to ask for UN financial support to AU 
operations on the basis of the existing gap between the commitments made by the 
organization and the resources at its disposal.13 Indeed, even resource-rich Nigeria found it 
very difficult to sustain its military engagement in Liberia and Sierra Leone, which has cost 
some US$ 4 billion to the government in Abuja.14 However, the mobilisation of resources is 
also the result of political will and choices. As an example, Ethiopia has been able to 
intervene in Somalia in several instances outside the framework of any regional or 
international organization. As we have seen with Nigeria in Chad, then in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, or with Ethiopia in Somalia, specific contexts of regional competition affecting an 
African power may have created a context conducive to African financial ownership in 
military interventions. 
                                               
11 In the end, the transformation of the African mission in Mali into a UN mission may make this contribution 
unnecessary. 
12 Interview with an EU official, Paris, January 2013. 
13 UN, S/PV.6092, 18 March 2009, p. 9. 
14 F. Olonisakin, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone, op. cit., p. 44. 
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Otherwise, the limitation of Africa’s financial contributions to peace operations is 
better understood when keeping in mind that most peace missions are called for by external 
actors as much as by Africans themselves. This is the object of our second section. 
 
African Operations Financially Supported by External Actors 
When African troops are not part of a UN mission, their presence in peace operations has 
been most often funded by the voluntary contributions of external donors. We have identified 
this model, for instances, in Chad (1981-1982), the CAR (1997-1998; 2002 until today), Côte 
d’Ivoire (2002-2004), Burundi (2003-2004), Darfur (2004-2007) and Somalia (2007 until 
today). Here, we first retrace the forms taken by this kind of partnership, before addressing 
the question of its political implications (who depends on whom and with which political 
effects?). 
 
African Peace Operations as Division of Labour between Africans and Donors 
External support may be provided directly to the troop contributors or to the regional or sub-
regional organizations in charge of the operation. In the context of the OAU mission in Chad, 
out of fear that direct aid to the organization may compromise its independence, donors (i.e. 
France and the US) were asked to offer support to the participating states on a bilateral basis. 
Today, while bilateral aid remains significant when it comes to the material and logistical 
requirements, financial support is generally managed at the level of the mandating 
organization, which can thus assert its control over the operation. In recent operations (CAR 
and Mali), ad hoc financial cells have been established to channel the aid to the operation. 
Such units, which include representatives of the donors, also allow for more transparency in 
Supprimé: (and Politically-Driven?) 
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the administration of support; thereby helping to overcome the suspicions of mismanagement 
(or corruption), which have emerged in the operations in Darfur and the CAR.15 
While aid from individual states was predominant in the past, most contributions 
nowadays are channelled through regional organisations. The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), for instance, offered logistical support to the AU operation in Darfur 
(2005-2007), while the EU has become the main (financial) partner of African organizations. 
Through the African Peace Facility (APF), an instrument of the European Development Fund, 
the EU has been taking charge of the greatest share of the budget of the missions in the CAR, 
Darfur, Somalia and Mali.16 For some time, Western countries have tried to encourage other 
donors to participate in the funding of African operations, with very little success. At this 
stage, only Turkey has responded to the call to support the AU Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM). Moreover, the Turkish US$ 1 million contribution remains relatively small given 
the needs of the operation, which has become the largest ever deployed by an African 
organization (17,000 soldiers), and to which the EU contributes no less than €19 million a 
month.17 
African peace operations are therefore most often the result of a specific division of 
labour between African and non-African, in fact Western, actors, where the former provide 
the human resources and the latter the financial, technical and material (equipment) ones. 
Without this external voluntary funding, the AU could not have become such a big player in 
peace operations. Yet, this direction was not obvious when the AU undertook its first full-
fledged peacekeeping mission in Burundi (African Mission in Burundi, AMIB) in 2003. At 
that time, the AU did not respond to a strong lobbying from external donors. The initiative 
came from inside, from South Africa. It stemmed from Nelson Mandela’s appointment as 
                                               
15 ‘Des euros “évaporés” par millions au Darfour’, Libération, 16 July 2007. 
16 For instance, the EU is paying 70 percent of the MICOPAX budget. 
17 Interview with an EU official, Paris, January 2013. 
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facilitator to the Arusha peace negotiation (1999-2000) and the subsequent deployment of a 
South African Protection Support Detachment to this country in October 2001. Burundi would 
eventually become a test for the AU in the eyes of Pretoria. The UK then directly supported 
Ethiopia as an AMIB contributing country, while South Africa bilaterally supported 
Mozambique and, as leading nation, delivered the logistic support needed by the force as a 
whole. Then the EU used its new APF to cover the allowances paid by the AU to the troops. It 
was the first time partners offered direct support to the AU’s peace and security activities.18 
The situation repeated itself with the AU mission in Darfur (AMIS), established in 
2004. However, external actors, mainly Western countries, exerted intensive lobbying to get 
the AU to deploy the operation. Their support included the prospect of takeover by the UN, 
despite Khartoum’s hostility. These partners would also become providers of funding. The 
most spectacular contribution came from the APF, which alone brought € 305 million to the 
AMIS funding, out of € 440 million dedicated to the Facility between 2004 and 2007.19 The 
US, the UK and Canada also provided AMIS with important contributions, while African 
financial support remained insignificant.20 
A noticeable limitation of the EU Peace Facility is that it cannot, in principle, fund 
expenditures with clear military aims (military training and equipment, etc.). Like in Burundi, 
in Darfur the main part went to fund AMIS soldiers’ allowances. Bilateral contributions by 
                                               
18 Interview with a senior officer of the Peace Support Operation Division (PSOD) within the Department for 
Peace and Security of the AU Commission, Addis Ababa, October 2008. This military officer was in charge of 
the Darfur dossier since the beginning in 2004. 
19 Ibid., pp. 16 and 26. 
20 Like the other AU missions thus far, AMIS could not count on the AU member states’ contributions to the 
Peace Fund, which the organisation had created in 2004 to fund its peace missions. N. Pirozzi, EU Support to 
African Security Architecture: Funding and Training Components, Occasional Paper, Paris: European Union 
Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2009. 
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other partners – including EU states – then complemented the APF support by providing war-
fighting capacity-building, ammunitions and weapons. Significantly, partners did not rely on 
the permanent structures in charge of logistical support for peace operations (Peace Support 
Operations Division), and opted for the creation of a Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) as 
an ad hoc transmission belt (including funding) between them and the AU Department for 
Peace and Security. Interestingly though, the DITF office was placed in Addis Ababa outside 
the AU headquarters (at Adams Pavilion, a few meters away from it). 
These levels of funding did not help turn AMIS into a success. They revealed the 
structural weaknesses of the AU support services for peace operations, their low ability to 
absorb an important, but irregular, flux of financial support and to transform it into 
operational efficiency.21 Beyond the Darfuri situation, the deficiencies have more generally 
concerned staffing and logistics within the Peace and Security Department of the AU 
Commission, and the inefficient Military Staff Committee.22 These shortcomings were 
identified by an external audit commanded by the AU in December 2007 on the staff 
resources of the organization. It drove the AU and its partners to launch projects of large 
                                               
21 J. Cilliers, ‘Force africaine en attente: État des progrès accomplis dans sa mise en place’, Institut d’études de 
sécurité / Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria), Article 160, March 2008, pp. 13-14. These difficulties are 
clearly demonstrated through the case study of the AU in Darfur, according to C. Guicherd, L’UA au Soudan: 
Enseignements pour la force africaine en attente, New York: International Peace Academy, March 2007, pp. 16-
19; and A. Ekengard, The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): Experiences and Lessons Learned, FOI 
Report, Swedish Defence Research Agency, Division of Defence Analysis, Stockholm, August 2008, notably pp. 
36-39 and 40-41. 
22 Audit of the AU, submitted by the High Level Panel to the President of the AU, 27 December 2007. 
  
13 
recruitment for the AU Department for Peace and Security, with the contribution of external 
experts and consultants.23 
AMIS also reflected the negative impact of too direct a dependency on external 
voluntary contributions, which followed their own tempos, and often overlapped with one 
another. In the end, the AU suffered from the political sensitivity of Western governments – 
particularly during electoral periods in the US and the UK – to well-organised lobbies calling 
for more robust intervention in Darfur or, at least, for a takeover by a UN mission even 
without Khartoum’s approval.24 Eventually, Sudan, the AU and UN leaderships, as well as 
external partners, agreed in November 2006 on a UN-AU joint mission, UNAMID. 
 
Are African Actors Not Interested in Autonomy? 
In most cases mentioned above, African operations have resembled sub-contracted 
interventions or actions by proxies. African peace operations have often resulted from the 
initiative of non-African powers unwilling to intervene themselves, but eager to get a 
stabilizing force deployed. From the outset, they have then encouraged African states to 
contribute troops by promising them financial and material support. France has displayed its 
ability to induce African allies to participate in peace operations on several occasions, either 
as a way to replace her own soldiers, for instance in 1997 in the CAR, or as a complement to 
her own action, for instance in Mali.25 
                                               
23 Interviews with two officers of the EU delegation following the activities of the partner group for peace and 
security matters, and with the team leader of the UN DPKO / AU Peacekeeping Support Team in Addis Abeba, 
November 2008. 
24 D. Lanz, ‘Why Darfur? The Responsibility to Protect as a Rallying Cry for Transnational Advocacy Groups’, 
Global Responsibility to Protect 3, 2011, pp. 223–247. 
25 The Mission de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui (MISAB) was deployed in the Central African Republic 
in 1997. Its presence allowed the French troops to withdraw in 1998. 
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Of course, such a division of labour has political implications so that African troop 
contributors are not in a position to act autonomously. In particular, the level and nature of 
external support largely shapes the characteristics of peace missions (size, mandate, duration, 
etc). For instance, the AU has for a long time asked for an increase in AMISOM’s number of 
troops, claiming as early as October 2010 that 20,000 personnel were needed. This request 
was only – partly – accepted in February 2012, after the UNSC adopted resolution 2036 
authorizing the deployment of 17,000 troops, and donors (the EU in particular) accepted to 
increase their support.26 
But this is only part of the story. Decisions are usually taken through a lengthy and 
difficult dialogue between all, in which Africans still keep strong leverage. Aware that their 
action fits into the agenda of Western states and of the donors’ unwillingess to intervene 
themselves, the actors of the continent can manipulate their partners through some kind of 
blackmailing (‘if you don’t pay, we will withdraw and create a security vacuum’). In this way, 
African actors have sometimes decided to intervene on their own, and later ‘send the bill’ to 
their traditional backers. In January/February 2013, the rapid and autonomous deployment of 
Chadian forces to Mali through Niger was greeted by the international community. Later 
President Déby made it clear, however, that he expected his country to be reimbursed for its 
action. 
Beyond this, African contributing countries can also find immediate benefits to this 
division of labour. First and foremost, contributing troops gives access to a sort of 
‘geopolitical rent’, as the case of AMISOM illustrates. Through an analysis of Uganda’s 
involvement in this operation, Jonathan Fisher allows us to support the claim that the funding 
of African operations reflects what we would call a pattern of extraversion. By developing an 
                                               
26 European Commission, ‘More EU funding to increase AMISOM troop strength’, 23 February 2012, 
http://brussels.cta.int/index.php?searchword=Rondos&option=com_k2&view=itemlist&Itemid=54, accessed on 
12 January 2013. 
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image of regional peacemaker in Somalia, Uganda has increased its leverage on the 
international scene and thereby succeeded in nuancing the diplomatic condemnations of its 
destabilising military involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since 1998.27 
In this sense, Museveni follows the path of other regimes that have bet on their relations with 
Western partners (Meles’ Ethiopia and Kagame’s Rwanda), primarily in Washington and 
London, to ensure their consolidation as sub-regional powers. 
The calculations made by the regimes in Burundi and Kenya, whose troops joined the 
Ugandan units in late 2007 and mid-2012 respectively, are similar. It has been pointed out that 
Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza has gained, if not a reputation of a peacemaker (like 
his predecessor Pierre Buyoya), at least international indulgence regarding the management of 
Burundi’s internal affairs, while his democratic credentials have been recently put into 
question by non-governmental organizations.28 Suspicions on Burundian acquisitions of 
military equipment with (EU-funded) soldiers’ allowances also shed light on the potential 
financial advantages associated with the participation in peace missions. Besides this 
controversial point, some donors in Bujumbura were recently feeling that the Ministry of 
National Defence was getting used to the millions of dollars it was receiving from AMISOM 
sponsors, and counted on them for its regular functioning as a structural rent rather than as a 
temporary, contextual, situation that would require anticipation.29 More broadly, for the 
national armies of war-torn states, contributing to a peace operation offers access to training 
programmes and equipment that may help enhance their professionalism, efficiency and 
                                               
27 J. Fisher, ‘Managing Donor Perceptions: Contextualizing Uganda’s 2007 Intervention in Somalia’, African 
Affairs 111, 2012, pp. 404-423. Concerning the extraversion of African rulers, we refer to J.-F. Bayart, ‘Africa in 
the World: A History of Extraversion’, African Affairs 99, 2000, pp. 217-67. 
28 International Crisis Group, Burundi: A Deepening Corruption Crisis, Africa Report 185, 21 March 2012. 
29 Interviews with two top managers of Security Sector Reform programs in Burundi, Bujumbura, December 
2011 and November 2012. 
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discipline. In the eyes of political elites, it may provide soldiers with a well-paid occupation 
that may retain them from interfering in national politics.30 
Regarding Kenya, participation in AMISOM resulted from the integration of the 
soldiers that intervened in Somalia in October 2011. Through this move, and as Kenyans are 
still largely acting autonomously, Nairobi was able to externalize the funding of its military 
presence in Somalia, though its intervention actually reflected a purely national decision. 
Following the kidnapping of Westerners in northern Kenya, earlier in 2011, Operation Linda 
Shi (‘Protect the nation’) was undertaken to create a buffer zone between the two countries, so 
as to prevent the spread of Somalia’s instability towards the south.31 
Examining the motivations of contributors in other missions does not challenge such 
patterns of extraversion. The case of Kenya in Somalia can indeed be paralleled with that of 
Chad in the CAR. By placing its troops under the (theoretical) authority of MICOPAX, 
Ndjamena was able to get funding and legitimacy for its action in this country. The disorder in 
this neighbouring state has threatened to spread into the southern part of Chad, where its oil 
fields are located. Rwanda’s contribution to the operation in Darfur offers another case worth 
mentioning. As argued by Danielle Beswick, “while Rwanda’s contribution to peacekeeping 
may be altruistic, it also serves to reinforce the present regime by highlighting its moral 
authority and ‘saviour’ role in recent Rwandan history”.32 Kigali’s leverage has become so 
great that it could even threaten to withdraw its troops from the AU/UN mission in Darfur as 
                                               
30 Fisher, op. cit., p. 418. 
31 International Crisis Group, The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia, Africa Report 184, 15 February 
2012. p. 3. 
32 D. Beswick, ‘Peacekeeping, Regime Security and “African Solutions to African Problems”: Exploring 
Motivations for Rwanda’s Involvement in Darfur’, Third World Quarterly 31, 2010, p. 752. 
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the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was to issue, in 2010, a report on the human 
costs of Rwandan involvement in Eastern Congo.33 
This section has presented some of the forms taken by ad hoc external support to 
African troop contributing countries and thereby shed light on some of the political interests 
bringing African states to accept institutional arrangements that make them rely on the 
goodwill of donor countries. The patent limits observed in the efficiency of this model –
described both above and below – has led to the establishment of two alternative options. 
Both are introduced below. 
 
African Operations Funded by the UN: A Model Gaining Ground 
Complaining about the lack of predictability of the aid brought on a voluntary basis, African 
states and organizations have for a long time asked for the support of the UN, and in 
particular its peacekeeping budget. They consider such aid would only be fair considering that 
their interventions are made on behalf of the ‘international community’ as a whole. 
In 2008, South Africa, then a non-permanent member of the UNSC, put the issue of 
UN support to African operations on the agenda of the Security Council. The report issued by 
the so-called ‘Prodi panel’ (December 2008), created following South Africa’s initiative, 
endorsed the idea of funding African peace operations through UN assessed-contributions, 
though in very strict conditions. With the explicit approval of the UNSC, UN member states 
contributions could be mobilized for a period of up to six months, after which the UN would 
take over the mission.34 Large contributors to the UN budget, like Japan and many Western 
states, including UNSC permanent members, opposed this idea on the grounds that it would 
                                               
33 Eventually, Rwanda could not prevent the publication of the report, but it obtained the right to insert in the 
very report its own responses and interpretations on the incriminated facts. 
34 UN, Report of the AU-UN panel on modalities for support to AU peacekeeping operations, S/2008/813, 31 
December 2008. 
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explicitly allow the UN to finance an operation, which is not under its control. The creation of 
a voluntary Trust Fund aiming at reinforcing the capacity of African organizations – another 
option put forward in the report – was then deemed more appropriate.35 
Contextual calculations by Western states have, however, brought them to trump their 
own doctrinal preferences, i.e. their refusal to mobilize the UN budget for operations which 
would not be under UN command. The recommendation of the Prodi Report regarding the 
resort to assessed contributions to the UN budget to fund African operations have then been 
put into practice in several cases – sometimes even in a more extensive way. UN support was 
first mobilized in the transition period between AMIS and the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in 
Darfur (UNAMID). ‘The logistical support package’ put in place for AMISOM, created in 
March 2009 and enlarged in several instances,36 constitutes a valuable complement to bilateral 
support that covers military equipment and the payment of soldiers’ allowances by the APF. 
Like in Darfur, the package was initially conceived as a strictly transitory measure. During the 
transition period from the Bush to the Obama administration (late 2008, early 2009), the US 
State Department showed – for a short period of time – some flexibility on the possibility of 
having UN blue helmets in Somalia. Other UNSC members endorsed this package as a way to 
alleviate the pressure of the AU regarding the immediate deployment of a full-fledged UN 
mission.37 In the end, given the lack of consensus on the creation of a UN operation, the 
package is, as of April 2013, still offering crucial support to AMISOM. 
                                               
35 For instance, see the statement of the French Permanent Representative to the UN in UN, S/PV.6092, 18 
March 2009, p. 25. 
36 The package covers the costs of various elements (oil, air transportation, water, etc.) and, since March 2012, 
helicopters, arms and vehicles. 
37 The AU requested the deployment of a UN mission from the very creation of AMISOM. In January 2007 
(Ugandan troops were deployed in March only), the Peace and Security Council requests the UNSC to consider 
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If UNSC members underlined that the mechanism in Somalia had been established on 
“an exceptional basis and owing to the unique character of the mission”,38 latest events have 
confirmed that decisions are actually taken on a case-by-case basis, depending on punctual 
political and financial interests. In the early 1980s, France, which was recently the most vocal 
opponent to the establishment of a ‘support package’ in Somalia, endeavoured in vain to 
obtain UN support to the OAU operation in Chad.39 Even more interestingly, Paris recently 
asked for the reproduction of this model in Mali, where it has been opposed by the US. 
In the end, this section tells us two things. First, it illustrates – once more – the fact 
that funding arrangements and inter-institutional cooperation mechanisms result from political 
negotiations rather than doctrinal or ideological concerns. Secondly, it makes clear that 
African states are gradually increasing their leverage in their relations with donors. Of course, 
Western states still keep the upper hand on decisions regarding the mobilization of UN 
resources since the mechanism described above is no way automatic. But with the 
multiplication of precedents, donors are put in an increasingly difficult situation to refuse its 
reproduction. 
 
UN Takeover: Rewarding Troop Contributing Countries and Sharing the Burden 
The previous section has showed that funding arrangements may take a particular form in the 
context of a transition from an African-led to a UN-led operation. The latter manifestly stands 
high in the scale of legitimacy, for it gives the political responsibility of the operation to the 
universal international organisation mandated to ensure peace and security worldwide. But is 
a UN-operation then still an African operation? In principle, the answer is negative. A 
                                                                                                                                                   
the sending of a UN force after the expiration of the six months mandate granted to AMISOM. AU, Peace and 
Security Council Communique, PSC/PR/Comm(LXIX), 19 January 2007, op. 14. 
38 UN Security Council Resolution 2036, New York, 22 February 2012, S/RES/2036, op. 6. 
39 R. Esmenjaud, L’africanisation et l’appropriation africaine des opérations de paix, op. cit. 
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takeover by the UN formally means a shift in the political chain of command to the benefit of 
the UN Secretariat and the UNSC. 
In practice, it depends on how influential African actors remain within the UN 
Secretariat. No one would seriously suggest that a UN peace mission in Africa can result from 
an exclusively African initiative to the sole benefit of particular African states, considering 
the weak positions African members hold in the UNSC.40 Yet, a UN takeover does not induce 
a complete loss of control from these contributing states’ military chiefs of staff. They usually 
keep a firm grip on operational and tactical choices of their national contingent. Notably, the 
UN Secretariat’s political ability to command depends not only on the UNSC members’ 
political support, but also largely on who holds the leading UN positions in the field (Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General, SRSG; Force Commander; and their deputies). The 
Secretariat is thus inclined to appoint a SRSG and/or a Force Commander who belong to the 
main troop contributing countries of the operation. 
What is important here is not to assess the degree of ‘Africanity’ or African ownership 
of UN operations on the continent, but rather to better understand the politics behind the 
transformation of African operations with African contingents into UN missions, which gives 
the African troops already deployed in the field a new institutional envelope. Indeed, through 
this takeover solution, partners provide African troop contributing countries with new 
opportunities. Intervening states are offered new logistical conditions for their soldiers, an 
actual financial rent through the distribution of UN-funded troops’ allowances, constancy and 
predictability in the funding of the operation, training and material support for the national 
armies concerned, and a new legitimacy (a UN mandate and a larger international diplomatic 
                                               
40 These weak positions are due to their inexistent weight in the UNDPKO budget, the predominance of the P-5 
(or even the Western P-3) in the drafting of the UNSC resolutions (which yet concern Africa in some 65 to 70 
percent of the cases), and to the lack of military liaison officers, civil staff, and institutional memory in many 
African permanent missions to the UN. 
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support). In this sense, the re-hatting with blue helmets gives external partners an original 
instrument to ensure high-quality financial support for African troop contributing countries. 
When is the UN to take over an African operation? In 2004, the ‘Burundi model’ 
formalised a quite efficient division of labour between the stakeholders, according to which 
the UN was to take over after the situation has been stabilized by a regional organization. 
Many other UN operations in Africa since the end of the 1990s have followed this scheme. 
This includes MINUAR (French acronym for the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda) in 1993, 
MINURCA (French acronym for the Mission des Nations Unies en République 
centrafricaine) in 1998, UNAMSIL (UN Mission in Sierra Leone) in 1999, UNOCI (UN 
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire) in 2007, UNAMID (Darfur) in 2007 and, most recently, 
MINUSMA (French acronym for the Mission Intégrée des Nations Unies pour le Stabilisation 
du Mali) As suggested above, the takeover often leans on a special relationship between 
African contributing countries and influential members of the UNSC. Regarding Darfur, one 
can mention the strong involvement of Washington and London in 2006 in order to obtain the 
transformation of the AU mission into a UN operation, and the diplomatic support they have 
granted to Kigali as a major troop contributor to these two missions. The position of lead 
country, acknowledged and sanctioned by UN diplomats and bureaucrats, offers a good 
empirical entrance for those who try to grasp the relationship between partners and African 
contributing countries from a sociological perspective. It shows that success in peace 
operations also lies in a large number of tasks, routine practices and informal norms that need 
to be assumed by a member state in a rather consensual way.41 
In the eyes of external partners, proposing a UN takeover is often considered as a way 
to propose a new funding model for the operation. Not only does it satisfy African actors’ 
                                               
41 D. Ambrosetti, ‘The Diplomatic Lead in the United Nations Security Council and Local Actors’ Violence: The 
Changing Terms of a Social Position’, African Security 5, 2012, pp. 63-87. 
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request for regular and predictable funding, but it can also alleviate their own financial 
responsibility. Among donors, the case of the US may be considered apart, given the extent of 
its assessed contributions to the UN budget for peace operations (27 percent). But when a 
‘middle power’ like France or the UK obtains the takeover of an African mission, which they 
were funding bilaterally or through regional mechanisms like the APF, they can significantly 
reduce their share of the burden. For instance, France’s assessed contribution reaches 19.5 
percent of the APF, compared to 7.56 percent in the UN peacekeeping budget. Even if UN 
peace operations are known to be more expensive than African-led missions, the 
transformation into a UN mission then still means money savings for Paris or London at the 
expense of the other major contributors to UN operations (particularly the UNSC permanent 
members, Japan, the Western European countries – notably Germany, Italy and Spain –, 
Canada and South Korea). In these circumstances, one understands better why France pushed 
for a UN takeover in Mali as it did in 1998 in CAR. 
When the takeover of an African operation by the UN is under discussion, such 
financial concerns are of course balanced with other considerations, including doctrinal ones. 
In particular, out of fear of putting the credibility of the UN at risk,42 it remains difficult for 
states, especially UNSC members, to send blue helmets to theatres where they do not have 
high chances of success. The so-called ‘Brahimi report’ made clear that UN operations should 
be sent when certain conditions are met, including the existence of a ceasefire (i.e. a peace to 
keep), and of a political process which the soldiers shall support. But in times of budget 
restrictions, it is more likely than ever that financial considerations trump such doctrinal 
concerns. In this way, France is suspected to have described the security situation in Mali in a 
                                               
42 M. Barnett, ‘The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda’, Cultural Anthropology 12, 
1997, pp. 551-578. 
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rather ‘rosy’ way so as to facilitate the creation of a UN operation and thereby a partial 
withdrawal of its troops. 
 
Conclusion 
African governments have rarely displayed any promptness to invest financial resources into 
integrated political-military arrangements that would allow Africa to reach the ‘security 
kingdom’43 its member states pretend to be aiming at.  Financial ownership – or lack thereof – 
has certainly much to do with material means available. However, African authorities taking 
the initiative to call for military operations and raise external funds have not been, as far as we 
could assess, much more frequent than African pledges for direct financial contribution to 
such operations. What is also lacking, many would argue, is political will. This question is 
probably where donors nurture their main disappointments vis-à-vis the African political class 
and constitutes the crux of the problem. This is the question we have intended to address 
through an examination of the existing financial arrangements that exonerate African actors 
from funding their own mechanisms for peace and security governance. 
Demonstrations of political will have existed and still exist, though. Several African 
operations have been initiated by actors of the continent. In the early ages of the OAU, 
assertiveness by African actors largely stemmed from a wish to demonstrate pan-Africanist 
ambitions and gain anti-imperialistic credits, with little operational follow-up. Political will 
was also displayed by particular sub-regional powers concerned by a foreign military 
presence in their vicinity (Nigeria with French presence in Chad), or by insurrectional 
movements affecting the stability of their spheres of influence (Nigeria with Liberia and 
Sierra Leone). South Africa’s and Uganda’s leadership roles in Burundi and Somalia 
respectively offer more recent examples of African assertiveness. 
                                               
43 A. Adebajo, The Curse of Berlin: Africa after the Cold War, London: Hurst and Co., 2010. 
Supprimé: 44
Supprimé: According to Adekeye Adebajo’s words in 
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Lack of political will, however, transpires in the weaknesses of the institutional 
arrangements that African states have created, or rather not created, to offer planning and 
visibility in the logistical and funding dimensions of their operations. When they have not 
themselves initiated the creation of the mission, external actors have been requested to bring 
their financial and material support so as to fill the gaps left by African actors. The UN aid, in 
particular, is called for by the leaders of the continent, for to their eyes it does not present the 
same level of sensitivity as the direct financial involvements of foreign states into their 
business. In this context, many African rulers demand closer connexion between the UN and 
the African regional organisations in matters of logistical and financial support. 
Understanding the existing financial arrangements underlying African peace 
operations – as this chapter has argued – can only be done by looking at the political 
relationship between external donors and troop-contributing countries, and more precisely by 
examining the patterns of extraversion shaping the policies of African states. Unfortunately, 
as we have seen, the participation of African actors in peace operations, as it is developing 
today, can hardly be seen as favouring African ownership, since it is most often based on 
some sort of geopolitical rent, or even purely financial motivations. Some may argue that such 
an extraversion strategy might play a constructive role on the long term, by facilitating the 
emergence of strong African states disposing of efficient military capabilities. One shall 
wonder, however, whose security such states are likely to promote. 
